Sectoral Reallocation, Growth and Labor Income Inequality by Hernan J. Moscoso Boedo
Sectoral Reallocation, Growth and Labor Income
Inequality∗
Hernan J. Moscoso Boedo†
University of Wisconsin Madison
November 12th, 2003
Abstract
This paper focuses on the transitory relationship between output level and Income
inequality. As a result of either permanent or transitory sectoral technological
shocks the economy will adjust to a new steady state equilibrium, but during the
transition the dynamics of wages and workers will generate departures from the
steady state level of income inequality.
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There is a broad literature both theoretical and empirical trying to understand the
relation between income inequality and growth. Unfortunately the evidence in favor of
the diﬀerent theories is not conclusive, suggesting that we may need new explanations to
this relationship. Based on frictions in the labor market this paper develops transitory
departures from a steady state relationship between output level and income inequality
as responses to sectoral speciﬁc technological shocks.
As Benabou (1996) reports theories relating growth and income inequality have
followed three main avenues.
The ﬁrst one is the one based on the political system as the pivotal mechanism
trough which inequality aﬀects growth. This part of the literature is characterized
by models of intertemporal utility maximizers agents where there exists a government
that redistributes income across households, and for that matter has to levy a tax on
everybody’s income. The endogenous determination of the tax, implies that the poorer
the median voter (or the worst the income distribution), the higher the tax rate and
therefore the lower the incentives to invest in this economy. In that sense, income
inequality and economic growth are negatively related. Examples of work in this area
are: Persson and Tabellini (1994, 1999), Alessina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1993),
Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1994), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1997), Wright (1996)
2and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000).
The second group of theories where a relationship between inequality and growth
arises is based on imperfections in the asset markets. The basic idea is that the existence
of imperfections such as borrowing constraints in any form (i.e. collateral constraints),
prevent agents from undertaking eﬃcient investment level and therefore growth or level
of output is negatively aﬀected. Work in this area include Galor and Zeira (1993),
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997).
The last group bases the link between inequality and growth in the social conﬂict.
That is, the higher the inequality, the more likely the possibility that the property
rights will not be protected and therefore the higher the possibility of being conﬁscated,
w h i c hi nt e r na ﬀects the investment decision negatively. References on this area include
Grossman and Kim (1996) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996).
All of these theories encounter severe diﬃculties when empirically tested.
Though lightened by the work of Deininger and Squire (1996), the lack of reliable
and internationally comparable data remains is a major problem, but also the evidence
suggests that there may be something else going on. Benabou (1996) reports the results
for 23 empirical studies on this area. The ﬁrst group of theories suggests that the poorer
the median voter the higher the transfer from rich to poor, which is something that is
not veriﬁed. The theories based on asset market imperfections, has an even greater data
reliability problem and therefore studies on that area have been even more limited. And
3ﬁnally the very notion of instability and the way it is measured puts another question
mark in the studies trying to verify the third group of theories. In this case the idea of
a two way relation between growth and inequality seems to be very plausible and this
identiﬁcation problem sets a limit in the ability of the data to conclusively support the
theory.
So far the theories exposed above have focused themselves in the long run eﬀects
of inequality on growth, without paying attention to transitory eﬀects. That is, they
mainly focused on the steady state equilibrium of the economy and the relationship
between inequality and growth there.
Findings by both Benabou (1996) and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) suggest that there
m a yb eac o n v e r g e n c ei nt h el e v e lo fi n e q u a l i t ya n dt h a td i ﬀerences across countries
may arise due to diﬀerent stages in the convergence process. In both studies they ﬁnd
a negative correlation between changes in inequality and past inequality suggesting the
existence of mean reversion in inequality and a convergence to a long run equilibrium
level of inequality.
On this line of reasoning this paper rests entirely on transitional adjustments to a
new equilibrium as a result of a sectoral technology shock. Previous work where the
transition to a new steady state involves changes in the distribution of income as a re-
sult of a technological change include Greendwood and Yorokoglu (1997) and Manuelli
(2001). Greenwood and Yorokoglu introduce human capital which will be used more
4intensively the newer the technology, therefore the introduction of new technologies cre-
ates a departure from the steady state level of inequality since the decision of human
capital accumulation is previous to the technology improvement. The story behind
Greendwood and Yorokoglu (1997) is one of diﬀerences across wages due to human
capital and the fact that the productivity improvements make a relative intensive use
of human capital. In their model there is no unemployment, whereas in this model
unemployment plays a central role in allowing workers to change across sectors in the
economy. Manuelli (2001) introduces a friction in the labor market and explores the
eﬀects of the introduction of a new technology since its discovery to its practical adop-
tion.
Based on Phelan and Trejos (2000), the economy will be composed by two sectors,
one of them producing capital and durable goods and the other non-durable goods and
services, where both sectors will be exposed to sectoral speciﬁc technology shocks, which
can be transitory or permanent. As a result of sectoral shocks, total factor productivity
across sectors will diﬀer and labor will have to be reallocated. The reallocation mech-
anism will not be instantaneous, in the sense that in order to transfer workers from one
sector to another, they will have to stay unemployed for at least one period. Therefore
any shock that induces reallocation of workers will induce a movement in the unemploy-
ment rate and during the transition to the new equilibrium wages across sectors will be
diﬀerent, which will induce to a diﬀerent distribution of income during the transition
5to a new steady state equilibrium than the one that will prevail in equilibrium.
As noted before, the changes in income inequality will only appear in the transition,
since unemployment will be the same across steady states and wages will be equal once
in a steady state equilibrium.
The model will generate similar short term responses to permanent and transitory
shocks, in particular with respect to inequality, with very diﬀerent implications for
growth or output level in the long run. Clearly permanent technological shocks will
have an eﬀect in the level of output in the future steady state, but transitory will have no
eﬀect in the new steady state once it is reached, but the initial response may be similar.
In other words, the relationship between inequality and growth is more complex than
in previous work in the sense that we may have countries undergoing transitory shocks
and permanent shocks, with eﬀects on inequality but the ﬁrst ones will experience no
long run growth whereas the second will show eﬀects on the level of gdp. Therefore
the interpretation of a simple panel regression where we mix temporary and permanent
eﬀects may be misleading.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the dynamic model is presented, where
the economy will be divided into two sectors and there will be a friction in the labor
market that will generate transitional diﬀerences in wages across sectors and therefore
transitional increases in the level of labor income inequality. In section 3, the model is
calibrated mainly using data from micro evidence or evidence from speciﬁcs t u d i e s . I n
6section 4 three experiments are run. First transitional increases in productivities, then
permanent ones and ﬁnally data from the post war US economy are introduced into the
model and dynamics calculated. Finally in section 5 the conclusion is presented.
2. The model
The economy will be populated by a continuoum of inﬁnitely lived individuals with mass











where cx denotes the ﬂow of services from the durable goods and cy is the consump-
tion of non durable goods and services. And 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, −∞ ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
There will be two sectors in the economy, x and y, where x will be the capital and
durable goods producing sector and y the non-durable goods an services sector. The
p r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o no fe a c hs e c t o ri sr e p r e s e n t e db y
x = ax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ K1−γ
x
y = ay (Ly(1 − my))
θ K1−θ
x
where x and y are the total outputs in each sector, Kxand Ky is the amount of
7capital devoted to production in each sector, (1 − mx) and (1 − my) are the hours per
worker directly involved in the production process, since mx and my will be the ”per
worker recruiting eﬀort”, Lx and Ly are the fraction of population working for sector x
and y, and ax and ay are productivity parameters. And 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Workers can be either in sector x,y or unemployed, and since population is normal-
ized to one, we have
1=Lx + Ly + u
The law of motion for workers in each sector, taken from Phelan and Trejos (2000)
is given by
L0
j = Lj(1 − φ)+ψLjuηm
1−η
j ;j = x,y
where a fraction φ is exogenously separated from their jobs and new workers come
into each sector according to the matching function ψLjuηm
1−η
j ;j = x,y,t h a ti s ,t h e
number of new matches is increasing in the number of people unemployed u a n do nt h e
average searching eﬀo r ti ne a c hs e c t o rLjmj;j = x,y.A n d 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, ψ ≥ 0.
Note that the law of motion for workers in each sector takes the amount of workers
in period t and the unemployment rate in period t as state variables. So far I am not
letting the workers quit their jobs in any moment. Only those exogenously separated
from their jobs may be matched next period in one of the sectors. This restriction
8has no implication in the steady state, but makes the dynamics slower than in the case
when workers are allowed to quit their jobs as a response to a technological change.
Capital in each sector follow a standard law of motion
K0
j = Kj(1 − δ)+Ij;j = x,y
where δ is the depreciation rate, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,a n dIj;j = x,y are the investment levels
in each of the sectors.
We will assume that capital will only be produced in sector x, that is, sector x will
produce capital goods which will be used in the production of new capital goods, and
non durable goods as well, appart from renting the services of the durable goods to the
household. So we have the following constraints
cx + Ix + Iy = x
cy = y
Ix + Iy ≥ 0
Let β be the discount rate.
So the planner’s problem can be written as:




















x = ax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ K1−γ
x
y = ay (Ly(1 − my))
θ K1−θ
x
1=Lx + Ly + u
K0
j = Kj(1 − δ)+Ij;j = x,y
cx + Ix + Iy = x
cy = y
L0
j = Lj(1 − φ)+ψLjuηm
1−η
j ;j = x,y
(Lx,L y,K x,K y)0 given
Ix + Iy ≥ 0
For the solution of the planner’s problem, see the appendix.
102.1. Competitive Equilibrium
If we think of a representative household that has to allocate a continuum of individuals
working in sector x, working in sector y, be unemployed and engage in the recruit
eﬀort for both sectors. That is, the household should engage in both unemployment
and recruiting eﬀort in order to supply sectoral speciﬁc labor to the market. The
household takes as given his/her unemployment level (it is a state variable) and the
average recruitment eﬀort in the rest of the economy Mj j = x,y, the return on sectoral
capital rj,j= x,y, wages in each sector wj,j= x,y and the relative price of non-durable
goods with respect to durable goods p. The consumer’s problem can be written as
follows:




















cxi + ixi + iyi + pcyi = wx(1 − mix)lxi + wy(1 − miy)lyi + rxkxi + rykyi
l0














ji = kji(1 − δ)+iji;j = x,y
ixi + iyi ≥ 0
Where lower case letter indexed by i represent individual level variables. cxi repre-
sents the ﬂow of services from durable goods that the household rents from the durable
goods producer sector x and cyi represents the consumption by household i of non
durable goods and services. lji represents the time consumer i spends working for sec-
tor j, l0
ji represent the time consumer i will spend working for sector j next period, kji
is the amount of capital consumer i owns which is an input in the production function
of sector j, k0
ji is the amount of capital consumer i will own next period which will
be an input in the production function of sector j. cji is the amount consumed by
consumer i from goods produced in sector j. iji is the amount invested in sector j’s
12capital goods by consumer i. ui is the amount of time unemployed. mij is the amount
of time consumer i spends recruiting for sector j . wj and rj are the wage rate and the
interest rate respectively paid by sector j. p is the relative price of goods produced in
sector y t a k i n gg o o d sp r o d u c e di ns e c t o rx as numeraire.
Note that using the law of motion for hours worked in sector j, we can obtain mij
and replace it into the budget constraint, and then replace cx into the utility function.
So, the problem of the household can be solved by choosing l0
ji,k0
ji and cyi for j = x,y,
given ui, Mj, wj, rj and p for j = x,y.




ax (lx(1 − mx))
γ k1−γ
x − wx(1 − mx)lx − rxkx





pay (ly(1 − my))
θ k1−θ
y − wy(1 − my)ly − ryky
Where lx and ly are the employment levels in the representative ﬁrm in sector x and
y respectively at the beginning of each period. kx and ky are the capital used in each
sector.
13From the ﬁrm’s problem wages and interest rates are determined as follows:
wx = γax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ−1 K1−γ
x
wy = pθay (Ly(1 − my))
θ−1 K1−θ
y
rx =( 1 − γ)ax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ K−γ
x
ry = p(1 − θ)ay (Ly(1 − my))
θ K−θ
y
For the solution of the competitive equilibrium, see the appendix.
The model will deliver an endogenous labor income inequality. That is, it will
endogenously determine unemployment, and labor shares in the sector x and y,t o g e t h e r
with wages in sector x and y. Assuming that the fraction of unemployed workers has
no income, it determines a three point Lorenz curve determining a gini coeﬃcient for
the labor income.
3. Calibration
The sectors in the model will be matched to the sectors in the US economy from 1950
to 2000. Sector x, the capital and durable goods producer will be matched to the
Manufacturing in durable goods sector plus the Construction sector, and sector y,t h e
non durable goods sector will be matched to the rest of the private US economy, that
14is non-durable manufacturing, services and agriculture.
The model has parameters for preferences, technology and the matching function.
The preferences parameters are estimated by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998). There they
estimate the exact same utility function and obtain parameters α =0 .2709, ρ =0 .143,
ξ =0 .23. In addition to those the discount factor β is set equal to 0.96 which is a
common value in the literature.
The matching function parameters are calibrated as follows. φ, the exogenous match
destruction rate is equal to 0.055 as in Cole and Rogerson (1999)1. η,t h ee l a s t i c i t yo f
the matching function with respect to unemployment is set equal to 0.4 as in Blanchard
and Diamond (1989), which is a value frequently used in this kind of literature. Other
papers like Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995) and Phelan and Trejos (2000) use the same
estimate. Finally the constant in front of the matching function ψ is calibrated so that
the model delivers a steady state level of unemployment of 5.5%.
The technology parameters are the ones that are calibrated to match moments of
the pre WWII US economy. ay is set equal to 1 and ax, γ and θ are calibrated to deliver
a share of employment in the durable goods sector equal to the average from 1929 to
1940 of 18.53%, the average of Investment to GDP2 from 1929 to 1940 of 19.05% and a
1They use 0.055 as the quarterly match destruction rate, and argue that it may be over estimating
the actual match destruction rate, so, I’ll use 0.055 as a yearly match destruction rate in order to account
for this over estimation
2Note that since in the model the household rents the capital services from sector x.T h e v a l u e o f
investment that is analogous to the model is the sum of consumption of durables and private investment
from NIPA tables
15labor share of GDP of 70%. Finally the depreciation rate is set equal to 10%, which is
a common value in the literature.
4. Dynamics
The model will be solved as follows. First calculate an initial steady state and a ﬁnal
steady state (which will diﬀer from the previous only in the ﬁnal values of productivity
parameters ax and ay. With those calculated, now I feed to the model a vector of
parameters axt and ayt and set a suﬃciently large time frame for the model to converge
to the ﬁnal steady state. The model has four Euler equations per period, so the system
will have the number of equations and unknowns equal to four times the number of
periods that takes the system to converge to a new equilibrium, which will deliver
the vectors for sectoral employment and sectoral capital. Once I have the system of
equations, I solve it nonlinearly. Once solved for L0
j,K0
j j = x,y, the wages, interest
rate, relative prices, total output, unemployment and labor income distribution are
calculated using the sectoral employment and capital as inputs.
I will run three experiment in order to learn about the relationship between the labor
income inequality and Output. First it will be a permanent increase in the productivity
levels ax and ay separately, second a temporary increase in the productivity levels ax and
ay separately and ﬁnally I will feed the vectors of ax and ay as reported by the Bureau of
16Labor Statistics for the values of Multifactor productivity in the corresponding sectors
for the US economy for the period 1950-2000.
4.1. Permanent increases in productivity
When feeding to the model a vector of productivity ax, where productivity increases
10% once and for all, the results in terms of labor income inequality, total output, and
other relevant quantities and prices are described by ﬁg u r e s1 ,2 ,3a n d4 . . O nt h e
other hand, if the same change in productivity takes place in the non durable goods and
services sector as depicted by ﬁgure 3, the results in terms of labor income inequality
total output and other relevant quantities and prices are shown in ﬁgures 5, 6, 7 and 8.
























i Gini Coefficient 
Real Output 
Figure 1














































































Relative wage in durable goods sector 
Unemployment Rate 
Figure 2





















































Relative Wage in durable goods sector
Unemployment rate 
Figure 6
































































Relative price of durable goods 
Fraction of employment in durable goods 
Figure 3































































Relative Price of Durable Goods 
Employment in durable goods 
Figure 7























We can see from the results shown above that the evolution of relative prices, interest
rate, and relative wages display a slower adjustment to a new equilibrium in the case
where the jump in productivity occurs in the durable goods sector. In both cases
unemployment rate falls initially, which is driven by changes as a response of the shock
of the search eﬀort. The evolution of relative wages is responsible for the diﬀerent
18reaction in the gini coeﬃcient. The relative price of durable goods in the case where
the increase happens in its sector, shows an initial increase and then a long monotonic
decreasing convergence to a lower equilibrium. The initial reaction of the relative price
of durable goods is similar in the case where the increase in productivity took place in
the non durable goods and services sector, but instead of decreasing afterwards, it stays
at a higher level. The employment also displays a similar initial pattern in the two
cases, but is diﬀerent in its convergence to the new long run equilibrium. In the case
of the increase in the durable goods sector, the employment in that sector, decreases,
but then overshoots its equilibrium and converges ﬁnally, whereas in the other case, it
converges monotonically to the equilibrium level after the initial drop.
4.2. Temporary increases in productivity
If instead of feeding a permanent increase in either of the productivities, I feed a tempo-
rary one , that jumps 10% in one period, stays 10% above its long run level for 5 periods
and returns to the long run level in the 6th period, to stay there forever, the results are
as follows. When the temporary increase of 10% occurs in the durable goods sector,
the relationship between labor income inequality, total output and other relevant prices
and quantities are shown in ﬁgures 9 through 12..
On the other hand, when the temporary increase in productivity happens in the non
durable goods sector the results are reported by ﬁgures 13 through 16.
19As reported in ﬁgures 9 and 13 the initial reaction of real output, measured with
relative prices constant at the initial level, in both cases it drops. That reaction is
induced by the fact that the total search eﬀort increases, so there are less workers
devoted to the production process. In the case where the temporary increase occurs in
the durable goods sector, the total search eﬀort increases from 7% of total labor force
to 9.7%, with a dramatic increase in the search eﬀort in the non durable goods and
services sector and a fall in the durable goods sector search eﬀort.


































































































































Relative wages in durable goods sector 
Unemployment Rate 
Figure 10



























































Relative wages in durable goods sector 
Unemployment rate 
Figure 14



























































Relative price of durable goods 
Employment in durable goods 
Figure 11






































































Employment in durable goods sector 
Relative price of durable goods 
Figure 15




























The agents are exploiting the temporary increase in the durable goods sector by de-
voting as many workers as possible to the production process and therefore temporarily
abandoning the search eﬀort, which explains why employment in the sector experiencing
the temporary increase in productivity suﬀers a decrease in its share of labor force as
reported in ﬁgures 11 and 15. In the case where the temporary increase in productiv-
ity occurs in the non durable goods sector we see an increase and a later decrease in
unemployment, which is entirely determined by the evolution of the search eﬀort. On
aggregate it falls from 7% to 4.5% initially.
The evolution of unemployment together with the path displayed by relative wages
determine the evolution of the gini coeﬃcient. The relative wages follow an expected
21pattern, with an initial increase in the wage of the sector that underwent the temporary
productivity increase. Prices and interest rates also follow opposite behaviors according
to where the productivity increase took place.
4.3. Simulation for the post war US economy
In order to feed the actual vectors of productivities of the US economy for the period
1950-2000, I will assume that the economy was in a balanced growth path from the
distant past to 1950, and from 1950 to 2000, I will feed the deviations from the aggregate
multifactor productivity vector for each of the sectors as shown in ﬁgure 17. That is,
I will assume that the planner knew in advance the evolution of aggregate multifactor
productivity in the economy and that the initial belief was that the sectoral multifactor
productivities would display the same evolution as the aggregate one. Then, in 1950 the
agents are surprised by new paths of sectoral multifactor productivities as shown. The
actual values for sectoral multifactor productivities where taken from BLS for the US
sectors manufacturing in durable goods and total private multifactor productivity. With
those I calculated the path of multifactor productivity in the non durable and service
sector by calculating the percentage deviation of the sectoral multifactor productivity
to the aggregate multifactor productivity assuming that the three series start in 1950
with the value of 1.



















































Productivity in non durables 
Productivity in durables 
Figure 17
The results of the experiment of feeding the series as in Figure 17, are shown in
ﬁgures 18 through 21.












































































































Relative price of durable goods
Deviation from steady state 
Employment in durable goods sector 
Figure 20























































Relative wage in durables 
Unemployment rate 
Figure 19
























23As shown the real output stays below its balanced growth path and the relative price
of capital stays above its path. Reallocation is taking place as we can see from the
path of employment in the durable goods sector and also in the relative wage. Note
that both employment and wages in the durable goods sector display a similar patter
with an initial jump and a subsequent decrease to the equilibrium. The unemployment
rate is driven by the search eﬀort, and here the search eﬀort in the durable goods sector
in particular is increasing. The gini coeﬃcient stays above its equilibrium level during
the convergence to the new steady state, which is driven by the optimal timing in the
allocation of workers. That is, the reallocation across sectors is permanent till the new
equilibrium is reached and that we can see from the evolution of relative wages in ﬁgure
19. There is an initial increase in the relative wage in durable goods sector, but then
around 1960 the model predicts that the wage in the non durable goods sector be higher
than that in the durable goods sector.

















24If I calculate the very same gini coeﬃcient from the actual data for the post WWII
US economy, the relation between the data and the model is depicted by ﬁgure 22. The
correlation coeﬃcient between the model and the data is 0.52. Comparing the two
series we can see that there is a diﬀerence in the ranges of labor income inequality, the
m o d e lp r e d i c t si tt ob eb e t w e e n0 . 0 5 5t o0 . 0 7a n di nt h ed a t ai ti sb e t w e e n0 . 0 8a n d
0.14. This diﬀerence in scale may be driven by diﬀerences in human capital required
across sectors which would induce an equilibrium inequality higher than that induced
solely by unemployment as in the model. We also see that the behavior of the actual
gini coeﬃcient is much more volatile than that suggested by the model, which could be
explained by the assumption of perfect foresight in the model. That is, in the model,
the agents know in 1950 the path of productivities from then on.
5. Conclusion
So, in essence there are two eﬀects determining the relationship between output and
inequality. First there is a physical rigidity due to the fact that the planner ﬁnds
optimal to reallocate workers across sectors following a cyclical pattern as seen in ﬁgure
20. That pattern generates increases in inequality which are captured in ﬁgure 18 from
1950 to 2000. Then there is an information eﬀect. The timing of information and the
perception of wheter the changes in productivities are permanent or transitory generate
25diﬀerent reactions of the economy
As it can be seen from the results of the experiments undertaken above, the rela-
tionship between inequality and growth depends not only on the relative productivities
across sectors during a transition to a new steady state, but also on the structure of
information that the planner has. That is whether he/she believes that some change
in productivities is permanent or transitory and how in advance of the actual change in
productivities the news is known. The introduction of uncertainty and a more complex
informational structure would be the future steps in research to try to reproduce the
actual path of inequality.
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t ht h eﬁndings of Benabou (1996) and Banerjee and
Duﬂo (2000) in the sense that inequality displays mean reversion, but raise a question
mark on panel data studies trying to relate growth and inequality in the sense that
the structure of information should be taken into account and there may be countries
experiencing transitory changes in productivities whereas others permanent ones with
diﬀerent implications for the relationship inequality - growth.
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7. Appendix
The solution of the planner’s problem is the following:




















29x = ax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ K1−γ
x
y = ay (Ly(1 − my))
θ K1−θ
x
1=Lx + Ly + u
K0
j = Kj(1 − δ)+Ij;j = x,y
cx + Ix + Iy = x
cy = y
L0
j = Lj(1 − φ)+ψLjuηm
1−η
j ;j = x,y
(Lx,L y,K x,K y)0 given
Ix + Iy ≥ 0




























Therefore the consumption functions in are only functions of Lj,L 0
j,K j and K0
j for
j = x,y , so, the planner’s problem can be reduced to the choice of L0
j and K0
j given
the state variables Lj and Kj for j = x,y.



























































































T h eE n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sa r eg i v e nb y :























































































































The Foc and the Envelope conditions properly updated once determine the four
Euler equations governing the dynamics of the system. Therefore the system has 4
Euler equations per period determining L0
j,K0
j j = x,y.
If T= number of periods in the system, I solve 4T equations and unknonwns non-
31linearly
The Competitive equilibrium solution coincides with the planner’s problem as fol-
lows:
From the ﬁrm’s problem wages and interest rates are determined as follows:
wx = γax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ−1 K1−γ
x
wy = pθay (Ly(1 − my))
θ−1 K1−θ
y
rx =( 1 − γ)ax (Lx(1 − mx))
γ K−γ
x
ry = p(1 − θ)ay (Ly(1 − my))
θ K−θ
y
For the household problem, deﬁne
e cx = wx(1 − mix(l0
xi,l xi,lyi))lxi + wy(1 − miy(l0
yi,l yi,l xi))lyi +




































































































And the envelope conditions:


































































































(1 + rx − δ)








(1 + ry − δ)
After applying the equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities (mij = Mj)i n
the expressions above we get the exact same four Euler equations as in the planner’s
problem.
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